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WILLIAM DESMOND, The 
Intimate Universal (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 
2016), pp. 506.  
ISBN: 978-0231178761,  
Paperback, £50.00. 
 
We are quite used to hearing 
about the history and 
significance of the problem of 
the one and the many as the 
impetus which first gave rise in 
Ancient Greece and the 
Ancient Greek speaking world 
to science and philosophy itself, 
that is, to reflection on things 
around us in physis in search for 
a principle that would explain 
the connection between those 
many things, the continued 
existence of this issue in the 
middle ages with the problem 
of universals and particulars 
that occupied those doing 
metaphysics in the mode of a 
Thomas, or a Scotus, or an 
other, its comprehensive 
resolution in modern philoso-
phy by Hegel in his science of 
philosophy and its rejection in 
Nietzsche’s science of no 
philosophy (postmodernism), 
up to and including today’s big 
bang theory in contemporary 
physics. We are much less 
accustomed to hearing about 
the problem of the intimate 
universal in philosophy. This, 
however, is the topic of the 
reflections of The Intimate 
Universal, and we have some 
indication of the direction in 
which this author’s enquiring 
mind into this issue will go in 
its sub-title: ‘the hidden 
porosity among religion, art, 
philosophy and politics’.  
From this subtitle, one may 
think that the author has left 
science out of the equation. In 
one sense, he has. So, do not be 
disappointed, if you are looking 
for empirically verifiable or 
falsifiable statements, scientific 
hypotheses, or eternally true 
propositions in this work. In 
another sense, however, he has 
not precisely because the kind 
of ‘science’ that is sought and 
demonstrated in the book is 
exactly the ‘porosity’ of the 
thinking itself that occurs in the 
between of philosophy, 
religion, art, and politics.  
This ‘porous space of 
communicability’ occurs in 
science too at atomic and sub-
atomic, molecular and cellular 
levels (p. 233, see also his 
reference to his earlier Being and 
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the Between), but it is with the 
manifestation of the ‘intimate 
universal’ in the arenas of 
religion, art, philosophy and 
politics that guides and binds 
together this author’s 
reflections on these distinct but 
related activities of the human 
spirit. So, it is of importance, 
then, to know what kind of 
‘science’ the book actually 
delivers.  
Underpinning Desmond’s 
work is the (correct) assumption 
that Hegel adheres more 
rigoursly to the Aristotelian 
motto ‘Scientia non est 
individuorum’ than the medieval 
Aristotelian Schol-astics did 
themselves.  
Yet such a conception of 
‘science’ (knowledge), before or 
after Hegel, presupposes both 
the existence and the 
intelligibility of singularly 
existing things. These sing-
ularities in existence and their 
intelligibility, nonetheless, are 
not grasped (known) or grasp-
able (knowable) in science or 
through science. This, however, 
does not mean that such 
existences do not exhibit their 
own kind of intelligibility that 
is amendable to philosophical 
reflection and science 
(knowledge); but such reflec-
tion, Desmond argues, has to 
steer a course that avoids the 
competing tendencies of the 
human spirit to engage in the 
(hasty and evacuating) general-
isations of particulars and the 
(dominant and destructive) 
universalisms of totalitarian-
isms, that is, between what 
Desmond diagnoses in the 
history of western thought 
(metaphysics) and philosophy 
(science) as a ‘servility’ to 
individuals generalized and a 
‘sovereignty’ of universals 
particularized.  
Central to Desmond’s 
concern, then, is the claim that 
there are ‘two fundamental 
orientations to the universal 
and the intimate’ (p. 23): one 
focused on the universal as 
opposed to the intimate; 
another focused on the 
intimate as opposed to the 
universal.  
Desmond’s alternative is to 
think the intimate universal, 
but ‘not quite [in line with] the 
concrete universal of Hegel’ (p. 
25), since the latter absorbs the 
particular into the universal 
concept, difference into self-
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contained sameness. A different 
approach is needed to preserve 
the universality in the intimate 
and the intimate in the 
universal, promising ‘a 
tantalizing harbinger of a being-
between that cannot be 
confined to either alternative’ 
(p. 24). Taking up this 
invitation, in turn, enables 
Desmond to see and analyse 
pairs such as cosmopolis and 
ghetto, religion and secularity, 
public and private, immanence 
and transcendence, the 
inclusive and the exclusive, 
totality and infinity, in their 
many manifestations in 
philosophy, art, religion and 
politics in modernity and post-
modernity (pp. 23–24). Whilst 
not rejecting significant 
affective accounts of ‘the 
horrifying Il y a of Levinas’ or 
‘nauseating viscosity of Sartre’s 
être-en-soi’ (p. 206), Desmond 
favours ‘an effort to bring out 
of recess something of this prior 
affirming of the good of the “to 
be”’ (p. 230). 
Those already familiar with 
Desmond’s previous work will 
recognise this approach as the 
continuation and fruition of his 
‘metaxological metaphysics’, 
and no doubt agree with his 
self-assessment that ‘without the 
metaxu it is hard to see how we 
could talk about the intimate 
universal’ (p. 33). In this regard, 
we could say that the metaxu 
acts as a kind of Kantian tran-
scendental pre-condition of our 
experiences of the universal and 
the intimate, and that this book 
is not a new departure for 
Desmond. Some indeed may 
think that one would need to 
have a deep acquaintance with 
his previous works (e.g. 
Perplexity and Ultimacy, Being 
and the Between, God and the 
Between) to understand this 
book. Yet, this is not the case. 
This study is self-contained. 
There are plenty of passages 
that summarize any technical 
terms used—by which I mean 
the meanings that Desmond 
has wrought from words and 
concepts to enable us to see the 
‘metaxu’ at work in thought, 
being and language. There are 
extensive and illuminating foot-
notes, a glossary of terms with 
paragraph explanations, and an 
index.  
In his study of The Logic of 
Analogy in the early 1960s 
Ralph McInerny remarked that 
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the concept of analogy in 
Thomistic metaphysics is itself 
analogous in its meanings; so, 
you cannot find a univocal 
meaning for it (and so, a fortiori, 
it would be a mistake to con-
struct one). The same applies to 
Desmond’s concept of the 
metaxu; it is metaxological in its 
metaphysical meanings. Yet this 
is why the author can think 
through meanings of the 
intimate universal when dealing 
with the latter in religion, in 
art, in politics, in philosophy 
(metaphysics) and in their inter-
connectedness, which he has 
not previously brought together 
into one systematic focus of 
enquiry. This marks this book’s 
originality.  
The book is divided into two 
main parts: Part I The Intimate 
Universal—Exoteric Reflections, 
comprising four chapters: Ch. 1 
Religion and the Intimate 
Universal: Neither Cosmopolis 
nor Ghetto; Ch. 2 Art and the 
Intimate Universal: Neither 
Imitation nor Self-Creation; 
Ch. 3 Philosophy and the 
Intimate Universal: Neither 
Theory nor Practice; Ch. 4 
Politics and the Intimate 
Universal: Neither Servility nor 
Sovereignty.  
Part II The Intimate 
Universal—Systematic Thoughts 
moves outside of established 
and demarcated areas of the 
human spirit (art, philosophy, 
religion, politics) to a systematic 
unfolding of the ‘intimate 
universal’, also in four chapters, 
on: Ch.5 The Idiotics and the 
Intimate Universal; Ch. 6 The 
Aesthetics of the Intimate 
Universal; Ch. 7 The Erotics of 
the Intimate Universal; and Ch. 
8 The Agapeics of the Intimate 
Universal. In Part II the starting 
point is not religion but ‘the 
being of the human in all its 
ontological dimensions’ (p. 
202), beginning with the 
idiocity of being a human being 
in being, gifted with a 
‘primordial love of the good of 
the “to be”’ (p. 225). The to be 
of this being, nonetheless, is 
gifted and thus cannot be 
thought in isolation from the 
absolute other, God as Creator, 
as the giver of being. Thus 
Desmond finds traces (vestigiae 
Dei?) of this relatedness to 
radical otherness in the very idi-
ocy of one’s ‘own’ (hence Des-
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mond’s scare quotation marks 
around this word) being.  
This is Desmond’s gratitude 
to Augustinian philosophical 
anthropology—the stone exists, 
the animal lives, but a human 
being knows that a stone exists 
and an animal lives, and that 
we love to be, all in one. This, 
as Augustine argues, grants a 
metaphysical superiority to 
individual living human beings 
to other kindred living and 
non-living beings in and of the 
world around that human 
being; but of most significance, 
the human being, and here 
again Desmond follows 
Augustine, is not the measure 
of all things precisely because 
that individual human being, 
by nature, is made for God and 
by God, and without 
compulsion but out of agapeic 
service; i.e., the ‘agapeic giving’ 
(pp. 213–214) is on God’s part, 
parting esse to us before our 
passio essendi and conatus essendi. 
‘There is a measure higher than 
the human measure’ (p. 315). 
Thus, ‘[M]an is the measure of 
all things but not the measure 
of himself’ (p. 103). 
What Desmond attempts for 
the concept of ‘the intimate 
universal’ in Part II of this 
study is comparable to what 
Hegel attempted to do in the 
tracking of the dialectical 
unfolding of the concept of 
reason itself, but in an entirely 
different direction, that is to 
say, in a non-dialectically 
configurable construction of 
the human being that exists in 
the between of nothing and a 
God that willingly creates (gifts) 
out of nothing and out of love 
(and not out of necessity of the 
concept). This is why Part II is 
written and structured by the 
author’s desire ‘to offer 
systematic thoughts about the 
intimate universal in relation to 
the idiotics, the aesthetics, the 
erotics, and the agapeics of 
being’ (p. 201) and with the 
conclusion that, when ‘purged 
of its idols, the porosity of the 
soul is unclogged, its heart is 
ready in death for awakening, 
and the last passage, into the 
festivity of the divine’ (p. 418). 
‘Restless is the heart until it 
rests in the Lord’, as Augustine 
would put it, but God is no 
‘absolute monarch’ of 
(post)modern times (p. 356). 
It many respects, then, one 
should not be surprised that 
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Desmond starts Part I of this 
book with ‘Religion and the 
Intimate Universal’ and not say, 
with metaphysics or philosophy. 
Yet historical religions them-
selves have not measured up 
and paid heed to the ‘reverent 
finesse’, making a God out of 
God, instead, here on earth as 
‘counterfeit doubles’, whether 
such religions posit the 
existence of the universal or 
singular god as the source of 
their ‘intimate universal’, or 
posit the religionless religions 
of godless socialism or 
capitalism, the universal human 
consumer or socialized 
individual, as the source of 
their ‘intimate universal’, which 
Desmond tellingly calls the 
‘privatization of religion’ (p. 
51). ‘Does such immanent 
universals produce the 
counterfeit of the intimate 
universal? (p. 25), asks 
Desmond. One here thinks 
Desmond is in agreement with 
Camus’s critique of the 
‘substitute universes’ of theistic 
or atheistic origins that set up 
future values (e.g., classless 
state, totalitarian regimes, 
heaven etc.) to justify man’s 
gross inhumanity to man here 
on earth in response to the 
absurdity of existence and that 
renders all values now nought 
(L’Homme Révolté, 1951).  
Yet Desmond does not 
accept the meaninglessness of 
existence as the fundamentum in 
re of our metaphysical desire 
either to make sense of the 
socio-political-religious world 
around us or of our human 
natural desire for God which is 
not a man-made God (‘Man-
god’, p. 44), for within the 
human being we find that being 
to be ‘a surd surplus to 
absurdity’ (Part II, p. 205). In 
other words, our experience of 
being human is oriented 
towards a transcendent being to 
whom we are open and opened 
up to receive and identify 
ourselves for whom we are, 
however obscurely that kind of 
being (esse) we find our strange 
selves to be, which is as beings 
in the between of nothing and 
the Creator. If this relationship 
is not properly held in balance, 
the mis-appropriation of this 
relationship will be manifested 
in the individual, social and 
particular lives of our thought, 
will and actions and the way 
society is organised, that is to 
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say, in power relations of the 
‘polis’ and ‘cosmopolis’. Thus 
chapter one concludes noting 
the implications of a kind of 
religious thinking that has gone 
astray and that leads to a 
distorted view of the relation 
between religion and politics. 
In light of this, one would 
expect the following chapter to 
deal with this—it does not, we 
have to wait until the last 
chapter of Part I (Ch. 4 ‘Politics 
and the Intimate Universal: 
Neither Servility nor 
Sovereignty’). In between 
chapters one and four, we have 
a chapter on ‘Art and the 
Intimate Universal: Neither 
Imitation nor Self-Creation’ 
and Ch. 3 ‘Philosophy and the 
Intimate Universal: Neither 
Theory nor Practice’. These 
chapters prepare one to see the 
relevance of Ch. 4 as a renewed 
way of looking at the 
connection between religion, 
art, philosophy and politics 
illuminated by a Christian 
metaphysics of creation out of 
nothing omitted from much 
contemporary approaches to 
philosophy, art, religion and 
politics. ‘On the religious side 
of the issue,’ Desmond writes, ‘I 
would underscore the 
importance of the personal 
God for any understanding of 
the intimate universal’ (p. 41, 
see also, esp., p. 431, n. 17 for 
overcoming Pascal’s distinction 
between ‘the God of Abraham 
and Isaac with the God the 
savants’). This is underscored 
for any understanding of 
Desmond’s account of the issue 
in relation to art, philosophy 
and politics too.  
In Ch. 3, Desmond notes 
that ‘[T]o speak of Caesar and 
Christ is to speak of intimate 
singulars but also of 
communities with more 
universal reach’ (p. 170). Since 
Desmond both lives and 
reflects on life after Caesar and 
Christ, he must think the 
benefits of both. This, however, 
means deploying what came 
after Casear, of how to live in 
the world mindful of our 
position in relation to both 
Christ, the world, and God the 
Father as creator of all that is 
out of love, as immanent 
critique to what went before, 
that is, Caesar’s economic-
political empire of the world, 
for the purposes of overcoming 
(in the sense of going beyond) 
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the bounds of Hegelian 
sovereignty and Nietzschean 
existentialistic exercise of will-
to-power in face of servility of 
the masses characteristic of 
post-Kantian (post-) modern 
contemporary thought in 
religion, politics and ethics, 
e.g., ‘capitalist “Right”’ defence 
of ‘totalizing market’, and 
Nietzschean or Marxist 
‘voracious instrumentalism, 
whether individualist or 
communist’ (p. 183). Not only 
do these extremists ideologies 
have negative impacts on inter-
connected and inter-dependent 
‘conatural’ and ‘communal’ 
relations of family, selves, 
education, the state as guardian 
and outcome of the natural 
sociability of human beings, 
and the ordering and use of 
human and material resources, 
it has negative implications for 
any sovereignty or servility to 
religious forms of articulation. 
Yet since this is (should be) in 
deference to agapeic service that 
deals with the transcendent 
good, the universality of this 
position ‘is not the exclusive 
possession of the Christian 
tradition or of the religious of 
the Bible’ (p. 180). This means, 
therefore, that in one of main 
sources of our (post)modern 
disquiet and antipathy about 
the involvement of religion in 
ethics and in politics— ‘the wars 
of religion’—‘the solicitation of 
agapeic service was betrayed in 
religion itself’ (p. 182, my 
emphasis), that is to say, be-
trayed as manifested and under-
mined therein.  
Consequently, ‘an essential 
discrimination is lost—both for 
religion and for politics’ (p. 
182). It is Desmond’s 
contention, then, that not only 
Hegel and his followers or 
objectors (e.g., Nietzsche), but 
also politico-religious bigotry 
‘closed off’ and ‘clogged up’ the 
‘porosity’ found in Augustine’s 
City of God since ‘[W]hen […] 
Augustine wrote the City of 
God, its composition was both 
transpolitical [at that time] and 
yet [subsequently, at another 
time] immensely influential in a 
political sense, since it mediates 
our understanding of different 
powers and their proper 
intermediation, without re-
duction of the City of God to 
the City of Man, as happens 
with Hegel and his successors 
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[and religious bigots]’ (p. 184; 
and see, p. 335). 
We could say, then, that 
Desmond’s thinking fits fairly 
and squarely within Augustine’s 
position (Confessions, 13, 33) 
that creation ex nihilo ‘is “a te, 
non de te facta sunt”’ (‘things are 
made by you, not made of 
you’). This, for Desmond, 
includes the things made by us 
(politics, family, social 
formations, art, science, 
religious institutions, etc., the 
human-spiritual world)—these, 
no less than the things of 
nature, the sun or the moon or 
the stars, earth, wind, fire or 
water, cannot take the place of 
God as the transcendent being. 
This is why Part II of this study 
is necessary for it demonstrates 
the logic of the intimate 
universal in a positive manner. 
The task of Part I was to rule 
out false accounts and false 
localizations of the intimate 
universal in religion, art, 
philosophy and politics. In this 
regard, Part I is the prole-
gomena to Part II, but it is in 
Part II that the defence of Des-
mond’s philosophy of religion 
is elaborated. For this reason, 
this book offers itself as the 
starting point for a proper 
evaluation of Desmond’s work 
as a whole for the past number 
of years.  
One may think that this 
book (and any book of 
metaphysics) is intrinsically apo-
litical and highly abstract, and 
so, ‘for the birds that fly high 
but who do not land where 
wordly power condenses, 
consolidates, and circulates’ (p. 
157). This judgement, none-
theless, would be the rash 
judgment of only a reader who 
did not read this book. Firstly, 
we could do well to remember 
that for Aquinas (and not 
Aristotle), prudence is both a 
moral and an intellectual virtue. 
This is already testimony to the 
power of the intimate universal 
that occupies a space between 
theory and praxis that is neither 
blind nor translucent, but 
demanding of one (the 
luminaries) to do better in light 
of experience, reflection and 
the exercise of judgment. This 
is why Desmond is correct to 
remind us today that ‘[T]he 
wise discernment of the 
genuinely political must be 
practiced in the art of detecting 
idols and dealing prudently 
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with the immanent havoc they 
threaten’ (p. 161). ‘For politics 
is not a “theory” but requires 
also a practice of phronetic 
discernment in the domains of 
relatives.’ (p. 166). And such 
finesse in politics is needed to 
avoid ‘the huckster’ or ‘the 
tyrant’ taking over (p. 133). 
This task, however, lies ahead 
of us today. 
This book is replete with 
detailed and specific analyses 
and metaxological reflections 
on issues of common concern 
that cannot but touch every-
one’s heart, mind, soul, body, 
and intelligence, whether in 
relation to: the self and the fam-
ily, ‘the family that stays to-
gether prays together’, life and 
death, the pagan and the 
divine, ‘wise blood and earth’, 
original sin, ‘I cannot picture 
Christ grim’, cosmos and 
cosmetics, ‘the divine poeisis of 
naturing’, marriage as contract 
or vow, the three bachelors 
(Kant, Nietzsche, Schopen-
hauer), forgiveness, fact and 
value, the ‘asymmetry’ of the 
good of the to be and evil, 
‘Hobbes is right […] Augustine 
is more right’, the politics and 
politicization of (the) today, 
Heidegger as ‘fundamental 
ontologist, even Nazi, of 
Catholic upbringing’, and the 
‘secret source of love’ in the 
intimate universal that shatters 
binary views of the idiocy of 
being a being in being and the 
absolute other attested to in the 
Judeo-Christian faith tradition 
and historical unfoldings of 
perverse and reified religiosity 
in philosophy, science, religion, 
art and politics, from Hegel 
down to the present American 
Idol. This book is a serious and 
engaged work of contemporary 
thought, intimately mindful of 
the present, past and future as 
the universal domain of 
discourse that requires not less 
but more finesse in thinking in 
religion, art, philosophy and 
politics about issues of common 
concern to progress things 
further not backwards. It is thus 
a challenging read, as all 
reading worth its salt should be.  
It is not without reason, 
then, that the Metaphysical 
Society of America has awarded 
this book, The Intimate Univer-
sal, and honoured its author 
with the J. N. Findlay Award 
for the Best Book in Metaphys-
ics (2016-2017)—an Award the 
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author also and first received in 
1997 for his pioneering study 
in metaphysics of Being and The 
Between (1995). 
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